

## Message Text

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ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 AF-04 EUR-08 NEA-07 ISO-00 AID-01 SS-07

NSC-06 /037 W

-----091853Z 005287 /42

R 091210Z JUN 77

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5976

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USLO RIYADH

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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H PASS SENATOR STONE

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OREP (STONE, RICHARD)

SUBJECT: CODEL STONE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT

SUMMARY: DURING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT SENATOR STONE COUNSELED EGYPTIAN VERBAL RESTRAINT DURING INITIAL PHASE OF BEGIN CABINET IN ISRAEL. SADAT URGED ASSISTANCE OF USG AND SENATOR STONE PERSONALLY IN MOVING FORWARD PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND STATED THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED WITH "SIDE ISSUES" SUCH AS GULF OF SUEZ DRILLING DISPUTE. SADAT OPINED THAT SOVIETS BECOMING NERVOUS CONCERNING MOSCOW'S ROLE IN ME PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAD SUDDENLY REQUESTED THAT FAHMY  
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GO TO MOSCOW BUT PRIMARY EGYPTIAN DISPUTE AT PRESENT WITH SOVIETS IS IN AFRICA AND EGYPT MUST ACQUIRE US WEAPONS TO ASSIST HORN OF AFRICA STATES TO ROLL BACK SOVIET MENACE. SADAT REVEALED THAT EGYPTIAN AIRLIFT OF ARMS UNDER WAY TO SOMALIA AND NOTED THAT LIBYA HAD BEEN WARNED THAT EGYPT WOULD ATTACK IF CUBAN "MERCENARIES" MOVED INTO LIBYA. SADAT STRESSED THAT EGYPT WILL INSIST ON OFFICIAL LINK BETWEEN

PALESTINIAN STATE AND JORDAN PRIOR TO HOLDING OF GENEVA MEPC. SADAT NOTED THAT DISAGREEMENT STILL EXISTS BETWEEN EGYPT AND SYRIA OVER QUESTION OF UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION FOR MEPC. END SUMMARY

1. CODEL STONE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, MET WITH PRESIDENT SADAT FOR 75 MINUTES IN ISMAILIYYA JUNE 8. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TO US GHORBAL ALSO ATTENDED. AFTER SADAT AND SENATOR STONE HAD EXCHANGED GREETINGS, AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT CODEL WAS JUST COMPLETING EXTENSIVE ME TOUR AND SENATOR STONE VOLUNTEERED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS SADAT MIGHT HAVE CONCERNING TRIP.

2. ISRAEL. SADAT ASKED FIRST ABOUT STONE'S IMPRESSION OF POST-ELECTION ISRAEL, NOTING THAT MUCH DEPENDS UPON ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD SEARCH FOR PEACE. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN MORE FAVORABLE SITUATION FOR PEACE AMONG ARABS, AND ARABS HAVE OPENLY DECLARED THEIR ME STRATEGY, BUT NOBODY IN ISRAEL HAS "GUTS" TO DECLARE ANYTHING. NO CURRENT ISRAELI LEADER DARES TO FACE DOWN ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION. "I MISS THE OLD LADY" (MRS. MEIR).

3. SENATOR STONE OPINED THAT SEVERAL AMONG NEW ISRAELI LEADERS HAVE "NERVE", EZER WEIZMAN FOR EXAMPLE. TO SADAT'S OBJECTION THAT WEIZMAN "EXTREMIST", SENATOR REPLIED THAT WEIZMAN HAD DIFFERING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POSTURES. WHEN STONE FIRST MET WEIZMAN, WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS, WIZMAN HAD TAKEN VERY HARD LINE, BUT IN SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE MEETING, WEIZMAN HAD SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE "PRACTICAL". SAME APPLIED TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POSTURES OF DAYAN.

4. CONCERNING BEGIN, SENATOR STONE CONCEDED THAT HE HARD TO READ AT PRESENT. BEGIN IN MIDST OF NEGOTIATIONS TO FORM COALITION, TALKS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ARE PROVING DIFFICULT, AND HE FEELS CONSTRAINED NOT TO SPEAK FREELY TO ANYONE. BUT SENATOR STONE FELT THAT BEGIN WANTS TO WORK FOR ME PEACE. CONCRETE ACTIONS, RATHER THAN WORDS, WERE IMPORTANT INDICATOR IN CURRENT STAGE.

5. ME NEGOTIATIONS. SENATOR STONE OPINED THAT A FINAL, SIGNED, ME AGREEMENT WAS NOT POSSIBLE, EITHER IN 1977 OR 1978, EVEN AN AGREEMENT CALLING FOR VARIOUS PHASES IN SETTLEMENT. ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION SIMPLY NOT READY TO ACCEPT SETTLEMENT AT PRESENT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT NO PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED: BEGIN HAS STATED THAT SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS COULD BE EXPECTED IN SINAI AND GOLAN AND (MUCH MORE DIFFICULT) WEST BANK. NEW LEADERSHIP APPEARED MUCH MORE WILLING TO DISCUSS MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS THAN OUTGOING LABOR LEADERSHIP. ALTHOUGH THERE NO CURRENT SENTIMENT FOR "OVERALL SETTLEMENT," THERE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FOR "PROGRESS" ON "ALL FRONTS". LIKUD WANTS TO MOVE AND PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED QUICKLY, BUT ONLY THROUGH SPIRIT OF "MUTUALISM". LIKUD LEADERS WILL BE TOUGH NEGOTIATORS, ALTHOUGH REALISTIC.

6. SENATOR STONE COMMENTED THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE "TOUGH" TALK COMING OUT OF ISRAEL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. LIKUD MAKING STRONG EFFORT TO CUT DOWN LABOR ALIGNMENT IN HISTADRUT ELECTIONS AND LIKUD BELIEVES BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS TO MAINTAIN TOUGH FOREIGN POLICY STANCE. A FEW DAYS AFTER JUNE 21 HISTADRUT ELECTIONS, LIKUD GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY BE PRESENTED TO KNESSET, AND OPENING POLICY STATEMENT LIKELY TO BE "HAWKISH", "BRITTLE". SENATOR STONE'S ADVICE TO SADAT IN THIS SITUATION: SAY NOTHING, SO AS NOT TO FORCE NEW GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY INTO CORNER. LIKUD STATEMENTS WILL CONTINUE HAWKISH AS BEGIN PREPARES TO VISIT WASHINGTON, AND AGAIN EGYPTIAN SILENCE WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE. AFTER WASHINGTON TALKS, LIKUD LIKELY TO COME OUT WITH NEW SET OF POLICY STATEMENTS, "AND THEN WE CAN GET TO WORK." SENATOR STONE STRESSED THAT HE WAS ONLY ASKING EGYPTIAN FORBEARANCE FOR A MATTER OF WEEKS, NOT MONTHS, AND THEN MATTERS WOULD BE CLEARER.

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7. AMBASSADOR GHORBAL INTERJECTED THAT, BY THEN, PERHAPS ISRAELIS "WOULD HAVE TO CLIMB TOO FAR UP TREE EVER TO GET DOWN". SENATOR POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELIS ADEPT AT CLIMBING BOTH UP AND DOWN. SADAT THEN NOTED THAT HE AGREED "HUNDRED PER CENT" WITH CALL FOR VERBAL

RESTRAINT. SADAT RECALLED HE HAD URGED PRESIDENT CARTER, DURING APRIL VISIT TO WASHINGTON, NOT TO MAKE SO MANY PUBLIC COMMENTS, WHICH MIGHT PROVE HARMFUL TO PEACE PROCESS. TOO MANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS ONLY RESULT IN "AUCTIONEERING". SADAT HAD URGED PRESIDENT CARTER TO EXPEDITE DELIBERATIONS OF ME WORKING GROUP UNDER SECRETARY VANCE, BUT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS.

8. SADAT CONTINUED THAT, DESPITE SENATOR'S "PESSIMISM" RE EARLY SETTLEMENT, HE HIMSELF REMAINS OPTIMISTIC THAT A PROPER "FRAMEWORK" LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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FOR PEACE PROCESS CAN BE ESTABLISHED THIS YEAR. THIS FRAMEWORK IS SOMETHING ONLY USG CAN ESTABLISH, ALTHOUGH SOVIETS MUST BE CONSULTED, AND IT MUST BE ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO GENEVA MEPC. SADAT STRESSED THAT EGYPT NEEDS US CONTRIBUTION IN COMING PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS: SITUATION IS EASY TO SOLVE, USG CAN DO IT, AND MUST DO IT. USG MUST GIVE ITS OPINION, TO "SAVE FACE" OF THOSE ON BOTH SIDES WHO ARE AFRAID TO FACE PUBLIC OPINION, MUCH AS SECRETARY KISSINGER DRAFTED SUGGESTIONS WHICH LED TO AGREEMENT ON SAINI I. SINAI II AGREEMENT EXPIRES IN OCTOBER 1978 AND THERE MUST BE "GREAT PROGRESS" BEFORE THAT DATE. PROBLEM IS THAT, ALTHOUGH ARABS TRUST USG, ISRAELIS HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN ANYONE.

9. SENATOR STONE AFFIRMED THAT THERE WILL BE PROGRESS BY OCTOBER 1978, BUT OPINED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD NOT SET ANY DEADLINES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. IF DEADLINE ESTABLISHED, BOTH SIDES WILL BECOME PREOCCUPIED WITH PROCEDURES, NOT DETAILS, AND NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE REDUCED TO GAME OF TACTICS AND COUNTER-TACTICS AS MOMENT OF DEADLINE APPROACHES.

10. GULF OF SUEZ DISPUTE. SADAT MENTIONED THAT ISRAEL HAD BEEN CREATING CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS OF LATE CONCERNING AMOCO DRILLING IN GULF OF SUEZ. PRESIDENT OPINED THAT THIS MERELY AN ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO CREATE SIDE ISSUES WHICH DELAY SOLUTION OF CENTRAL PROBLEM. SEVERAL YEARS CAN BE CONSUMED IN DEBATING SUCH SIDE ISSUES, SUCH AS ARAB BOYCOTT AND SUEZ CANAL TRAFFIC, BUT GOE UNWILLING TO PLAY THIS GAME. EGYPT WILL NOT START HOSTILITIES OVER GULF OF SUEZ DISPUTE, EVEN THOUGH EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GUNBOATS HAVE "COLLIDED" IN AREA PREVIOUSLY, CAUSING EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE TO GO ON ALERT. GOE DOES NOT WANT TO SEE MOMENTUM OF PEACE PROCESS LOST ON SIDE ISSUES. HE KNEW FROM HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON THAT USG WORKING ON PROBLEM

11. US AID TO EGYPT. SENATOR STONE STATED THAT HE WAS PLEASED AND ENCOURAGED BY HUMPHREY AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN AID BILL ALLOCATING \$1 MILLION FOR STUDY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR OF EGYPT. SENATOR PLANNED TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THIS BILL AND MAKE SURE "MOST PRACTICAL" EXPERTS APPOINTED. SADAT WELCOMED STEP AND NOTED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THAT HE HAD INFORMED PEOPLE OF PORT SAID JUST PREVIOUS DAY CONCERNING EXTENT OF US AID TO EGYPT, PARTICULARLY IN CANAL AREA. SADAT POINTED OUT THAT EVERYONE HAD STATED, WHEN HE OPENED CANAL, THAT SUEZ HAD LOST ITS GLOBAL IMPORTANCE, BUT SUEZ REVENUES NOW TOTALLED \$500 MILLION ANNUALLY, THANKS IN LARGE PART TO US AID.

12. CONCERNING US AID TO EGYPT, SADAT NOTED THAT EGYPT NOT ASKING, DURING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, FOR USG TO GIVE UP ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO ISRAEL. US CAN EVEN SIGN DEFENSE PACT WITH ISRAEL. EGYPT USING ITS US CONNECTIONS FOR PEACE, ALTHOUGH ISRAELIS WILL RAISE "MILLION QUESTIONS" TO DELAY PEACE PROCESS. BOTH SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS ATTACKED EGYPT'S US POLICY AFTER SINAI II, BUT AFTER A YEAR ADMITTED "YOU WERE RIGHT". AS A POLITICIAN, PRESIDENT STATED, HE UNDERSTANDS ISRAELI AND SYRIAN DOMESTIC CONCERNS, BUT PROBLEMS OF PEACE SETTLEMENT ARE "70 PERCENT PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ONLY 30 PERCENT REAL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES."

13. FAHMY TO MOSCOW. SADAT OPINED THAT SOVIETS SUDDENLY BECOMING VERY NERVOUS CONCERNING MOSCOW'S ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS. SADAT NOTED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED THAT SOVIETS HAD "SUDDENLY" REQUESTED MEETING WITH FAHMY, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD MADE NO EFFORT TO RELIEVE SOVIET ARMS BOYCOTT OF EGYPT. SENATOR STONE THEN ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN HORN OF AFRICA, ABOUT WHICH SADAT HAD EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN DURING APRIL VISIT. SADAT STATED THAT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN HORN WAS ONE OF TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED BY GROMYKO AND FAHMY IN MOSCOW.

14. SOVIETS IN AFRICA. SADAT OPINED THAT PUBLIC SOVIET CHARGE THAT SUDAN SUPPORTING INVASION OF ETHIOPIA MEANS THAT SOVIETS "COOKING SOMETHING" CONCERNING SUDAN. SOVIETS WILL NEVER FORGIVE EGYPTIAN INVOLVEMENT IN TOPPLING COMMUNIST COUP IN SUDAN IN 1971, BUT EGYPT WILL NEVER ACCEPT TO SEE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN KHARTOUM AND DEVELOPMENT OF ZAIRE/ANGOLA SITUATION ALONG EGYPTIAN BORDER. SADAT ALSO STATED THAT EGYPT HAD BEEN ACTIVE OF LATE MOVING SOMALIA AWAY FROM SOVIETS. GOE NOW NOT ONLY SHIPPING SMALL ARMS TO SOMALIA BY SHIP, BUT AIRLIFT OF WEAPONS UNDERTAKEN "FOUR DAYS AGO". (NO FURTHER LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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DETAILS PROVIDED.) EGYPT ALSO PROVIDING WEAPONS FOR ERITREANS AND SUDANESE AND NEEDS ARMS BADLY FROM US. USG SHOULD REALIZE THAT THIS TYPE OF WEAPON (SMALL ARMS) WILL NOT BE USED AGAINST ISRAEL, BUT RATHER TO "FIGHT MY BATTLE AGAINST SOVIETS" IN AFRICA, "WHICH IS ALSO YOUR BATTLE". SADAT OPINED THAT EGYPTIAN SURVIVAL DEPENDS UPON BEATING BACK SOVIETS IN AFRICA. NO US TROOPS SHOULD EVER BE SENT TO AFRICA, BUT USG SHOULD REALIZE THAT SOVIET ARMS FLOWING INTO ETHIOPIA FROM PDRY AND LIBYA AND THIS MUST BE COUNTERED.

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15. CUBANS IN AFRICA. IN RESPONSE TO QUERRY BY SENATOR STONE  
CONCERNING EXTENT OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA, SADAT STATED THAT  
THERE WERE CURRENTLY "A COUPLE HUNDRED" IN ETHIOPIA, AND SAME IN  
LIBYA, TRAINING COMMANDO FORCES AT SIRTE. SADAT STATED THAT HE HAD  
WARNED QADHAFI THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT TOLERATE "MERCENARIES" IN LIBYA  
AND THAT EGYPT WOULD ATTACK IF LIBYA'S RELATIONS WITH CUBANS  
DEVELOPED IN THIS DIRECTION.

16. SOMALIA. SENATOR STONE STATED THAT HE HAD HEARD CONSIDERABLE  
OPTIMISM IN RIYADH CONCERNING POSSIPITY OF WEANING PRESIDENT SIAD  
AWAY FROM SOVIETS. SADAT AFFIRMED THAT SOMALIS DEFINITELY READY TO  
MOVE, BUT WERE ANXIOUS TO SECURE ALTERNATE SOURCES OF WEAPONS.  
SADAT WAS SURPRISED AT EXTENT OF SOVIET MILITARY CONTROL OVER  
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SOMALIA: EGYPTIAN ARMS HAD HAD TO BE FLOWN TO SECRET SOMALI AIRPORT WHERE THERE NO SOVIET CONTROL AND EGYPTIANS HAD GIVEN SIAD SERIOUS LECTURE ABOUT LETTING SOVIET INFLUENCE BECOME SO PERVASIVE.

17. SENATOR STONE THEN INQUIRED WHETHER THERE MESSAGE SADAT WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY TO SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. SADAT NOTED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO UNDERLINE ONCE AGAIN HIS COMMENTS CONCERNING SOVIET THREAT IN AFRICA AND TO STRESS THAT HE NEEDS HELP TO KEEP PEACE PROCESS MOVING IN 1977. ALL PERIPHERAL ISSUES WILL FALL INTO PLACE, BUT SADAT AND PRESIDENT CARTER NEED COMMITTEE'S HELP, AND SENATOR'S PERSONAL SUPPORT, ON SETTLEMENT OF CORE ISSUE.

18. PALESTINIANS. AMBASSADOR EILTS THEN ASKED IF SADAT WOULD COMMENT ON PALESTINIAN AND LIBYAN QUESTIONS. SADAT STATED THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER, IN 29 YEARS SINCE FORMATION OF ISRAEL, PALESTINIANS HAD NEVER BEEN AS DISCIPLINED AS AT PRESENT. RELATIONS BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND JORDAN MUST BE SPELLED OUT OFFICIALLY BEFORE GENEVA CONFERENCE. SADAT WOULD INSIST ON THIS AND THOUGHT HE COULD BRING IT OFF. SENATOR STONE REMARKED THAT, IF SADAT SUCCEEDED IN THIS, HE WOULD BE A MIRACLE WORKER.

19. LIBYA. SADAT RECALLED THAT, IN PAST, SOVIETS HAD ASKED USG FOR \$7 BILLION TO DEVELOP SIBERIAN RESOURCES. SADAT NOW WISHED OFFICIALLY TO INFORM USG THAT SOVIETS WILL BE RECEIVING \$6 BILLION FOR THIS PURPOSE FROM LIBYA, IN EXCHANGE FOR ONE ATOMIC REACTOR AND A STEEL MILL. SADAT WONDERED HOW COUNTRY OF 1.5 MILLION INHABITANTS ("99 PERCENT OF THEM BEDOUIN") COULD POSSIBLY EVER ABSORB SUCH ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY. SADAT RECALLED WARNING PRESIDENT FORD IN SALZBURG ABOUT ENORMITY OF LIBYAN PURCHASES FROM SOVIETS: DOWN PAYMENT OF FIRST SOVIET-LIBYAN ARMS DEAL HAD BEEN STAGGERING \$800 MILLION. WHEN SENATOR STONE ASKED WHETHER QADHAFI COULD EVER BECOME A "TEAM MEMBER" WITHIN ARAB LEAGUE, SADAT MERELY REPLIED THAT QADHAFI IS "HOPELESS: HE NEVER KEEPS HIS WORD." WHEN AMBASSADOR EILTS ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR LATEST LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN RECONCILIATION TALKS ARRANGED BY LIBYAN CONFEDERATION OF ARAB REPUBLICS ASSEMBLY SPEAKER BASHIR AL-RABTI, SADAT STATED THAT LIBYAN UBAYDI WELCOME TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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COME TO CAIRO TO TALK TO PM SALIM, BUT THIS ONLY "TACTICAL MOVE" BY QADHAFI, WHO OPENLY PLAYING SOVIET GAME AND "SOVIETS ARE AFTER MY NECK."

20. DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS. AMBASSADOR GHORBAL OPINED THAT, SINCE SENATOR STONE HAD TALKED WITH ALL PARTIES TO ME DISPUTE EXCEPT PALESTINIANS, SENATOR MIGHT GAIN SOME UNDERSTANDING BY MEETING WITH PALESTINIANS. SADAT STATED THAT IF SENATOR HAD WISHED, HE COULD HAVE BROUGHT ARAFAT TO MEETING. PRESIDENT CONTINUED THAT EVERYONE HAS TO SAVE FACE: PALESTINIANS KNOW THAT THEY SHOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL, ISRAELIS KNOW THAT THEY HAVE TO RECOGNIZE PALESTINIAN EXISTANCE. ONLY US CAN BRIDGE THIS GAP, PERHAPS DURING COMING PHASE

OF NEGOTIATIONS. SENATOR STONE QUESTIONED WHETHER MEETING WITH PALESTINIANS WOULD ENHANCE HIS EFFECTIVENESS IN ISRAEL, BUT EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF FACT THAT SADAT ONLY ARAB LEADER CODEL HAS TALKED WITH DURING CURRENT TRIP TO STRESS NECESSITY OF LINKS WITH PALESTINIAN STATE AND KING HUSAYN. SADAT'S ATTITUDE GAVE SENATOR ADDED SENSE OF OPTIMISM.

21. SYRIANS. NOTING SYRIANS SEEMED BE MOST HARD LINE OF ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES, AMBASSADOR EILTS ASKED SADAT IF THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT HE COULD BRING ASAD ALONG MORE MODERATE LINES. SADAT STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN "MISUNDERSTANDING" RE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN POSITIONS ON UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION AT GENEVA. PRESIDENT ASAD HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER AT GENEVA THAT GOE AGREED TO UNIFIED DELEGATION. ALTHOUGH UNIFIED DELEGATION WOULD SOLVE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, EGYPT DID NOT AGREE, BECAUSE SUCH A DELEGATION WOULD MEAN VETO OVER EGYPTIAN ACTIONS, EVEN THOUGH LEADER OF DELEGATION WOULD BE EGYPTIAN. SADAT STATED THAT HE UNDERSTANDS CONSTRAINTS ON ASAD (SYRIAN BATH POLITICS, THREATS FROM IRAQ), BUT GOE HAS WIDE FIELD OF MANEUVER AND DOES NOT INTEND TO GIVE THIS UP TO UNIFIED DELEGATION. SENATOR STONE CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY REMARKING THAT SYRIA WAS ONLY STOP ON CURRENT TOUR WHERE HE HAD HEARD ARABS WOULD GIVE UP "NOT ONE INCH" OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY. SENATOR STATED THAT HE DID NOT REALLY BELIEVE THIS STANCE, BUT WISHED THERE WERE SOME WAY TO MODERATE SYRIAN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PRONOUNCEMENTS.

22. SINCE CODEL DEPARTED SHORTLY AFTER RETURN TO CAIRO, THIS TELEGRAM COULD NOT BE CLEARED WITH IT. REQUEST DEPT. SUBMIT IT TO SENATOR STONE FOR APPROVAL OR ANY CHANGES HE MAY WISH TO MAKE.  
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